Numerical cognition and mathematical realism by de Cruz, H








This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 































broad	 generalizations,	 and	 look	 at	what	 the	 empirical	 data	 support.	
Fortunately,	we	are	in	an	excellent	epistemic	situation	to	do	this.	Nu-



























Premise	 2	 holds	 that	 a	 realm	 of	 abstract	 entities	 (in	 the	 moral,	
mathematical,	 religious,	etc.	domain),	 if	 it	exists,	does	not	 influence	
the	 evolutionary	 trajectory	 of	 the	 cognitive	 faculties	 that	 represent	
them.	Therefore,	(3)	evolved	beliefs	are	insensitive	to	the	truth-value	
of	abstract	objects,	which	leads	to	the	conclusion	(4)	that	our	evolved	
beliefs	 do	not	 track	 facts	 about	 abstract	 objects.	Appealing	 to	 parsi-
mony,	antirealists	argue	that	antirealism	is	more	compatible	with	the	
evolutionary	history	of	our	beliefs	than	realism.	
1.	 This	 schema	 captures	 the	 structure	 of	 evolutionary	 debunking	 arguments	
against	realism.	For	a	more	general	schema	for	evolutionary	debunking	argu-
ments,	see	Kahane	(2011).
about	 the	 compatibility	 of	 numerical	 cognition	 with	 realism	 or	
antirealism.	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	will	 look	 in	 detail	 at	 the	 functional	 properties	 of	
evolved	numerical	 cognition	and	examine	whether	 this	 supports	 re-
alism	or	antirealism.	 In	section	2,	 I	briefly	review	evolutionary	argu-
ments	 and	 realism	 about	 numbers.	 Section	 3	 looks	 at	 the	 nuts	 and	





be	 true,	 given	what	we	 know	 about	 evolved	numerical	 cognition.	 I	
formulate	an	argument	for	mathematical	realism	as	an	inference	to	the	




2. Evolution and realism about numbers
An enduring debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the 
ontological status of numbers, such as 2, π, and	34,295.17.	Realists	(e. g.,	
Baker	 2005)	 argue	 that	 numbers	 exist	 mind-independently,	 where-







ist?	Realism	about	numbers,	 as	well	 as	about	moral	 facts	 and	other	
putative	 abstract	 entities,	 has	 recently	 come	 under	 pressure	 from	






that	 affects	 their	 ability	 to	 represent	 numerosities,	 and	 of	 children	
with	 developmental	 dyscalculia	 (Mussolin et al. 2010), suggest	 that	
symbolic	arithmetic,	including	simple	arithmetical	operations	such	as	
addition	 and	 subtraction,	 crucially	 depends	 on	 our	 ability	 to	 repre-






digit	 3,	 and	 a	 collection	of	 three	 items	 all	 activate	 the	 intraparietal	







entities	 (e. g.,	 Dacke	&	 Srinivasan	 2008).	 This	 quick	 and	 unlearned	








key	 press)	 become	 increasingly	 imprecise	when	 having	 to	 estimate	
larger	numbers	of	key	presses	to	make	(Whalen	et	al.	1999).	
Higher	 magnitudes	 are	 represented	 approximately,	 and	 can	 be	





















detail.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 current	 cognitive	 scientific	 literature	 on	 nu-
merical	thinking	gives	us	no	good	reasons	to	believe	premise	2	is	true,	
which	opens	the	possibility	of	a	realist	understanding	of	this	literature.	
3. Evolved numerical cognition


















rus,	and	prefrontal	 cortex	 (see	Nieder	&	Dehaene	2009	 for	 review).	
The	 brain	 areas	 involved	 in	 recognizing	 numerosities	 and	 perform-
ing	 arithmetic	 are	 similar	 in	 rhesus	 monkeys,	 three-month-old	 in-
fants,	 young	children,	 and	numerate	adults	 (Izard	et	 al.	 2008).	This	










tebrates	 can	 discriminate	 numerosities	 in	 their	 environment.	 Since	
animals	spontaneously	use	numerical	information	to	guide	their	deci-
sions	(e. g.,	choosing	a	food	source,	approaching	potential	competitors,	
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distinct	 systems	 for	 representing	numerosities:	 one	 for	 small	 collec-
tions	(the	object-file	system)	and	one	for	larger	magnitudes	(the	mag-
nitude	system).	This	two-systems	account	explains	why	animals	rep-


















input,	provided	by	visual,	 tactile,	or	auditory	stimuli,	 constitutes	 the	
first	layer	of	processing.	The	stimuli	are	converted	into	representations	
of	 discrete	objects.	 For	 instance,	 our	 early	 visual	 processing	detects	
boundaries	between	objects	by	their	light	and	dark	contrasts.	These	
representations	of	discrete	objects	serve	as	 input	 to	 the	 location map, 
the	second	layer	of	processing.	The	location	map	abstracts	away	from	
individual	properties,	converting	each	object	into	a	separate,	parallel	
2.	 A	 competing	 model	 is	 the	 mode-control	 model	 (e. g.,	 Cordes	 et	 al.	 2007),	
which	proposes	 that	numerical	magnitudes	 are	 like	 cups	of	water	 that	 are	










en	 that	 truths	 about	numbers	do	not	 co-vary	with	first-order	 logical	
truths?	There	is	a	candidate	cognitive	mechanism	that	would	explain	






However,	 as	we	have	 seen,	 animals,	 infants,	 and	even	numerate	










What	 do	 approximate	 magnitudes	 track?	 Given	 the	 naturalistic	
angle	of	evolutionary	arguments	for	or	against	realism,	it	makes	sense	
to	let	our	ontological	questions	be	informed	by	the	scientific	practices	
in	a	given	domain	 (see	Bangu	2012	 for	a	defense	of	 this	claim).	Sci-
entific	practice	suggests	a	crucial	explanatory	role	for	numbers	in	re-
search	on	numerical	cognition.	Cognitive	scientists	take	care	to	isolate	




such	as	fish	 in	a	 shoal,	 to	examine	preferences	 for	 larger	 shoals,	 re-
searchers	take	care	to	control	for	visual	density	and	for	total	area	of	the	
shoals	(Dadda	et	al.	2009).	In	their	fMRI	study	of	numerical	cognition,	
2	 and	6	 (Tudusciuc	&	Nieder	 2007).	 Since	neural	 resources	 are	 lim-
ited,	 this	model	 predicts	 a	 logarithmic	 spacing	of	 neural	 thresholds,	
such	that	a	decreasing	number	of	neurons	are	allocated	to	increasingly	
large	numerosities.	As	a	result,	it	becomes	progressively	harder	to	tell	
apart	numerosities	as	 they	 increase.	Neurons	 in	numerosity	clusters	
respond	to	numerosities	in	a	wide	variety	of	formats,	including	visual,	
nonsymbolic,	symbolic,	and	auditory	formats	(e. g.,	Piazza	et	al.	2007).	
4. A realist case for evolved numerical cognition
4.1 What does numerical cognition track?
Based	 on	 a	 thought	 experiment	 involving	 ancestors	 predicting	 the	
presence	 of	 lions	 behind	 bushes,	 Clarke-Doane	 (2012)	 argues	 that	
animals’	adaptive	responses	would	remain	the	same	—	assuming	first-









ties	of	 the	ancestors	 in	 this	scenario.	All	he	argues	 is	 that	 the	first-
order	logical	properties	of	the	situation	obviate	any	need	to	invoke	
numerical	 facts	 to	 understand	 the	 ancestors’	 behaviors.	 He	 holds	
that	their	behavior	can	be	adequately	understood	with	the	first-order	
logical	 properties	 at	 hand,	 but	 is	 silent	 on	 how	 exactly	 this	 corre-
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this	does	not	 license	belief	 in	all	 its	theoretical	posits	(Maddy	1992).	
It	might	be	 that	mathematics	 plays	 an	 expressive	 role,	 an	 easy	way	
to	represent	numerosities	of	objects	that	the	brain	represents,	rather	
than	a	crucial	explanatory	role.	
To	make	 the	positive	case	 for	 realism,	 I	propose	 that	 the	best	ex-







of	 unobservable	 scientific	properties	 that	 play	 a	 crucial	 explanatory	
role	(like	electrons),	we	should	also	be	ontologically	committed	to	the	
existence	of	mathematical	entities.	




above	 ground.	 It	 is	 evolutionarily	 advantageous	 for	magicicadas	 to	
have	long	life	cycles	that	do	not	intersect	with	other	cyclical	periods:	it	
helps	them	to	avoid	predators	or	matings	with	similar	species.	13	and	









It	 seems	mysterious	 that	 acausal	 entities	 can	 figure	 in	 causal	 ex-
planations.	Clearly,	 long	 prime	 cycles	 do	 not	 intersect	with	 smaller	








the	 elements.	After	 habituating	participants,	 the	 authors	 found	 that	
the	bilateral	intraparietal	sulci	(IPS)	in	children	and	adults	were	more	
responsive	to	changes	in	number	than	changes	in	shape,	suggesting	










4.2 The indispensability of numbers for numerosities
I	have	so	far	argued	that	scientific	practice	provides	a	prima	facie	real-
ist	case	for	numbers,	since	neuroscientists	and	cognitive	psychologists	
are	 interested	 in	 isolating	 numerical	 properties	 of	 the	 environment,	
and	since	they	refer	to	numbers	in	their	explanations.	An	antirealist	
might	 respond	 that	 although	 cognitive	 scientists	 who	 propose	 the	
magnitude	 system	 invoke	 numbers,	 they	 also	 use	 fictional	 entities	
such	as	location	maps,	and	clearly	there	are	no	location	maps	in	the	
brain.	 Scientists	 often	 use	 idealizations	 (such	 as	 frictionless	 slopes)	
that	play	a	crucial	role	 in	their	theories.	A	particular	model	can	con-
sist	of	real	entities	(e. g.,	unobservables,	such	as	electrons,	and	observ-
ables,	 such	 as	 results	 of	measurements)	 as	well	 as	 fictional	 entities	
(e. g.,	 computer	 simulations,	 idealizations).	 If	 a	 model	 is	 confirmed,	


































Some	 realists,	 such	 as	 Joyce	 (2006)	 and	 Sinnott-Armstrong	 (2006),	











are	not	causally	efficacious.	 In	 this	case,	 the	process	explanation	ap-
peals	 to	 physical	 properties	 (the	 impenetrability	 of	 the	 overlapping	
parts	of	 the	peg),	whereas	 the	program	explanation	 cites	 geometric	
properties.	The	program	explanation	works	at	a	higher	level	than	the	





































patterns.4	 He	 outlines	 a	 rather	 elaborate	 staged	model,	where	 each	













This	 scenario	provides	a	naturalistic	account	of	how,	 from	a	 real-
ist	point	of	view,	children	can	learn	about	numbers.	Unfortunately	it	











of	 knowledge.	More	 recent	ways	of	dealing	with	 this	problem	have	
moved	 away	 from	 this	 framing.	 For	 example,	 Field	 (1989,	 26)	 gloss-
es	it	as	the	challenge	“to	provide	an	account	of	the	mechanisms	that	
explain	 how	our	 beliefs	 about	 these	 remote	 entities	 can	 so	well	 re-
flect	the	facts	about	them”	(see	also	Yap	2009).	Still,	any	naturalistic	










with	 structures	 that	 are	 conceived	 of	 as	 abstract	 entities	 (platonic	
universals),	 i. e.,	structures	that	exist	 independently	and	prior	to	any	
instantiations	of	them.	The	precise	nature	of	these	entities	is	left	un-
specified,	as	 it	 is	not	essential	 to	mathematical	practice.	 Just	 as	one	
can	talk	about	a	goalkeeper’s	function	in	soccer	(i. e.,	keeping	the	ball	







	 Helen	De	Cruz Numerical cognition and mathematical realism
philosophers’	imprint	 –		10		– vol.	16,	no.	16	(august	2016)
to	allocate	 clusters	of	neurons	 to	numerosities	of	 increasing	 size	ad	
infinitum.	The	adaptive	and	neural	constraints	together	explain	why	
decreasing	numbers	of	neurons	are	allocated	to	increasingly	large	nu-
merosities.	 In	 this	 picture,	 arithmetical	 facts,	 realistically	 construed,	
form	an	indispensable	part	of	a	physical-cum-mathematical	property	
complex.5 









There	 is	 a	 tension	 between	 realism	 about	 abstract	 objects	 and	 evo-
lutionary	accounts	of	human	cognition.	How	can	our	evolved	brains	
that	only	have	access	to	the	natural	world	acquire	true	beliefs	about	
putative	 abstract	 entities	 like	 numbers	 and	moral	 norms?	 Balaguer	
(1998,	 chapter	 8)	 has	 argued	 that	 empirical	 evidence	 can	 never	 de-
cide	between	realism	and	antirealism	because	we	have	no	epistemic	






5.	 There	 are	 other	 forms	 of	 structuralism,	 such	 as	modal	 structuralism	 (Hell-
man	 1989).	 Modal	 structuralism	 holds	 that	 mathematical	 statements	 are	
statements	 about	 possible	 structures.	 Modal	 structuralists	 aren’t	 ontologi-











approximately,	 with	 increasing	 imprecision	 with	 larger	 magnitudes.	








tion:	they	make	an	analogy	between	next in the numeral list and	next in 
series of object-files:	if	n	is	followed	by	n	+	1	in	the	counting	sequence,	
adding	an	individual	to	a	set	with	cardinal	value	n	results	in	a	set	with	











are	more	 ecologically	 relevant:	 the	 nutritional	 difference	 between	 1	
and	2	apples	is	large;	the	difference	between	10	and	11	apples	is	mar-
ginal.	A	fish	 is	 a	great	deal	 safer	 in	a	 shoal	of	 3	 individuals	 than	 in	
one	 of	 2,	whereas	 the	 difference	 is	 negligible	 for	 shoals	 of	 13	 or	 12	
fish.	There	are	also	neural	constraints:	brains	do	not	have	the	space	
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